CSEC 401 Environmental Risk

Dave Haynes - April 2001

The Precautionary Principle

and its use in environmental issues

1. Background to Precaution

Amongst European countries and probably globally, the German model is seen as one of the best examples of balancing a successful developed industrial economy with an environmentally sympathetic perspective. This position is not new. Germany has a deep rooted socio-legal tradition, extending back to, and in spite of, the 1930’s, a time when such a strikingly contrasting dogma as national socialism was endemic. Although several pollution control legislation initiatives were introduced in the interim, it was perhaps in the 1970’s that this melt started to crystallise. Notable in this was the introduction of the 1974 clean air act, with the typically Germanic extended title Bundes-immissions-schultz-gesetz or ‘Law for Protection against Harmful Environment Effects of Air Pollution, Noise, Vibrations and Similar Processes. BimSchG specifically incorporated Vörsorgeprinzip as a precautionary measure due to fears of acid rain causing damage to nationally prized forests. Vörsorgeprinzip, literally foresight planning, loses something of the depth of meaning that is found in the original form when translated to the English common usage as Precautionary Principle. Vörsorgeprinzip is one of three regulatory pillars in the German environmental policy, the others being Verursacherprinzip or polluter pays, the working of which is self explanatory, and Kooperation or consensus, whereby all interested parties such as trade unions and NGOs are involved in policy formulation.

At the roots of the Vörsorgeprinzip, the basic notions of care and wise practice are fundamental in the management of human impacts on the environment. Damage to the environment should be avoided in advance and research should be co-ordinated with particular emphasis on cause and effect relationships. Action to protect the environment should not rely on a burden of scientific proof. Reduced environmental impact technologies should be encouraged. The precautionary principle as elaborated by O’Riordan & Cameron (1994) contained six sub-principles:-

1. Preventative anticipation

Action is carried out in advance of scientific proof because a delayed ‘wait and see’ attitude becomes excessively damaging to the environment and the biota that inhabits it. This is further applicable if human existence is considered in terms of stewardship, having duty of care for future generations. The mindless hunting to extinction of the dodo on Mauritius in the 17^th century is a distillate of the greater macrocosm of human interaction with the environment.

2. Protection of ecological space

Natural systems have an ultimate potential for damage receipts, beyond which recovery is not possible. Extinction is the actual demonstration of this. Provision of a margin of tolerance which anticipates these actual limits recognises that the limits should not be approached, let alone exceeded. This has the simultaneous effect of enlarging the apparent assimilation capacity of receptors.

3. Cost effectiveness of error margins

Under conventional methods of cost benefit analysis, the introduction of precaution would seemingly distort the balance, appearing as an over expensive consideration that may be an early victim in budget reductions. The external nature of precaution will always make it prey to the obvious internalities of this method of assessment. By including a weighting in the cost benefit analysis as a consideration of ignorance of unknowns and responsibility to the future, precaution becomes included as a internal cost, albeit an arbitrary one.

4. Duty of care on proposers of change

In theory this would mean that anyone with public liability under civil law also has complete liability for any damage to the environment due to their actions. Potentially this may be a disincentive for imagination, invention or speculative behaviour. Crucially though, the nature of the competitive free market means that the responsibility imposed on those proposing change will also stimulate enterprise in technology and economics. Novel ways of preventing environment damage and of remediation will be developed in response to the given constraints.

5. Right of nature to function

This is an extension of the raised value of the natural environment brought about be precautionary principle, as this increased respect of nature also highlights the right of nature to continue its daily functions without being abused by man, be it for extraction, processing or disposal of the goods that attend human society.

6. Paying for the past

The forward looking concept of precaution can also be directed retrospectively if the duty of care is applicable to past cases where ignorance or unwillingness to take responsibility for actions has left environmental fingerprints, or in many cases, large footprints. Whereas the bulk of the precautionary principle is ideally governed by law, the concept of paying for past misdemeanours is further controlled by the imposition of fines.

 

2. Case Studies In Support of the Precautionary Principle

2.1. Acid Rain

It was perhaps felt in parts of the UK government that the problem of air pollution was resolved with the introduction of the 1956 and 1968 Clean Air Acts. As is now well appreciated, by using an policy of dispersal in preference to reduction, the building of higher smoke stacks to broadcast the pollution merely passed it on to someone else. In 1982, aware perhaps of mounting concern but unwilling to jump into as yet weakly founded precautionary action, the government reversed a previous decision to cut acid rain research funding. The anticipated release later that year of a Department of Environment preliminary report on acid rain may have acted as an additional incentive for prior government action, albeit small. The final release of the UK Review Group on Acid Rain report (UKRGAR, 1984) showed the first significant evidence of acid deposition in the UK. Prerequisite to any acid deposition is a source of pollutants, to which the UK contributed significantly. The UK government, and in their shadow, the Central Electricity Generating Board, subscribed to the common line of denial of acid rain, demanding more research before taking binding decisions. Lacking a history of precautionary action prior to evidence, various arguments were put forward to justify minimum action, such as nitrogen oxides from transport being more significant than gases from electricity generation and that abnormal fish mortality in lakes of Norway, Wales, Scotland and Sweden was caused by aluminium leaching from soils, not acid rain. Whilst most other European countries were subscribing to cuts of at least 30% of existing emissions, the ’30 per cent club’, in accordance with the LRTAP Convention (ECE, 1979), the UK remained unmoved. In 1984 sulphur deposition in the UK stood at amongst the highest levels in Europe being ranked 5^th out of 14 countries sampled (Park, 1984), and yet, in this same survey, of the total UK deposition, little of it was imported. The UK was 80% self sufficient in acid pollutants. In contrast, Scandinavian countries received the highest proportion of imported acid deposition and whilst the actual amount of pollutant was much less than the UK, the igneous geology and thin drift deposits meant that little buffering capacity existed. This contrasted with the calcareous chalk and limestone scenery that is found throughout large parts of the UK which significantly reduce the effect of any acid deposition. The combination of the high cost of retro fitting pollutant reduction systems to power stations and the lack of visible environmental impact in the UK were probably the single main reasons why the government at the time was so persistent in following the hard cause - effect policy instead of the precautionary principle adopted by many others. As scientific evidence of acid rain mounted, along with pressure from countries receiving most acid rain damage, in 1986 the British government admitted that UK sulphur emissions from fossil fuel power generation was causing acid rain in Norway. Despite this, the UK was slow to complete ratification of the LRTAP Convention. Although ultimately the UK did ratify most parts of the treaty, the fromal undertaking to reduce sulphur was still outstanding in 1998 (Acid Rain, 2001). This may be a result of the ‘dash for gas’ initiative in the UK in the late 1990’s which caused a reduction in the emissions of sulphur, therefore removing the need to ratify LRTAP in full.

The UK handling of the acid rain situation shows typical British lethargy in this field which is endemic in some other industrialised nations, notably the United States. On the surface, the argument of caution is used, that steps should not be taken unless backed up by a high degree of technological proof, such that doubt is no longer present, or at least that the doubt is not large enough to outweigh the cost of action. Beneath this scientific, logical, ordered sheen however is the self centred interests of an industry which does not want to change the status quo, one of predictability and security, required ultimately for economic growth and shareholder contentedness. Fundamental to the argument against providing flue gas emission reduction technology is the high cost associated with this, compounded by lack of knowledge on the cause – pathway – effect linkage. The acid rain scenario is repeated and magnified in the case of CO₂ emissions and the suspected anthropogenically induced enhanced greenhouse effect. At a stroke, an incoming US president is able to abandon moves towards a tentative acceptance of the enhanced greenhouse effect, on the basis that it is not scientifically proven. Under this cover, the familiar ugly story is manifest, that the new administration is heavily sponsored by the fossil fuel industry who, understandably do not want to see change. Ironically, this same industry is ensuring it enacts its own form of precautionary principle by opening up research into renewable energy sources. Let us hope that the energy change is not too late.

2.2. North Atlantic Fisheries – the Grand Banks and the North Sea

One of the main arguments for not using the precautionary principle is lack of scientific evidence. The case of the Grand Banks fishery is a demonstration of how science can fail the environment in a large way, in this case by completely misinterpreting the assimilatory capacity of nature. This is perhaps a demonstration of where the precautionary principle may have been beneficial. The Grand Banks fishery off the south eastern coast of Newfoundland in the north west Atlantic was once described as the worlds richest fishery, producing almost 1 million tonnes of cod per annum, in the 1950’s when scientific monitoring commenced as a means of management. Based on annual survey data, supposedly safe quotas of 16% of total fish stock were perennially set by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Despite this scientifically based management, catches fell, such that in 1977, the total stood at only 20% of that 20 years earlier. The science behind the quotas was felt to be sound, based on the theory that a 16% annual removal from the population was sustainable. In reality, incorrect interpretation of conflicting evidence distorted the survey results. These results were based both on a singular scientific survey trawl and the rate that commercial vessels landed fish. These twin results tallied until in 1989 when the single survey trawl showed anomalously low results. Crucially, this was taken to be an outlier in the data and the higher figure preferentially selected. Whether this occurred as a genuine error is unclear, but politics at the time placed a lot of pressure on maintenance of fleets and the associated fishing levels. In fact, the commercial figures used in the data analysis were distorted. Fast modern trawlers are able to target fewer, more isolated shoals efficiently using sonar, and modern techniques ensure that when fish are found, they are harvested rapidly. Reduced fish population is not necessarily reflected in an hourly recovery rate, once the shoals have been found. The distorted stock estimate meant that quotas reflecting what was thought to be 16% of total stock, were nearer 60%. Fishing ceased completely on the Grand Banks in 1992, with hardly any adult cod remaining, the fishery was effectively barren. The human price was 40,000 people unemployed in the fishing industry.

The Grand Banks scenario is reflected throughout the fishing industry. In 1992 the European Community set in motion a project for long term fisheries goals however in four years little progress had been made, partly because of sectors of the scientific community doggedly unwilling to accept faults in existing fishing assessment methods or to use alternative models. The attitude that was present in some quarters is exemplified by one unnamed scientist stating that acceptance of any new systems would imply that they (scientists) didn’t know what they were doing previously. In 1996 the UK House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (S&TC) called for firm advice from government scientists in a form that political managers could not ignore (New Scientist, 1996) It was felt by the chairman of the S&TC that caution in accuracy of models was giving politicians an excuse for political compromise. In 1997, with only 4% of cod surviving to maturity, the EU proposed reducing the total allowable catch (TAC) from 60% of stock to 40%. Due to loopholes, the TAC can be distorted so that it doesn’t have the same remedial effect that actual reduction in fishing vessels would have (WWF, 2001).

Following indications from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in November 2000 that the cod stock in a sector of the North Sea was in serious risk of collapse, the EC quickly drafted an emergency recovery plan (EC, 2001) that was enacted almost immediately. In conjunction with Norway, the co-manager of the fishery, it was agreed that cod fishing would be prohibited between mid-February and the end of April 2001, notionally the spawning season. Effectively this restricted trawling to only bottom dwellers and this was policed by observers posted on ships. The World Wildlife Fund has expressed concern that this period is not long enough and that the ban should be for a year with the introduction of further, more longer term proposals (WWF, 2001).

The North Sea instance shows how if the evidence is strong enough, then governments will act to prevent further anthropogenic damage to the environment. However, with fish stocks on the verge of collapse and the recent experience off eastern Canada, the evidence was extremely compelling. Furthermore, the amount of effort to address the situation was much higher than if precaution had been used well before the problem became so large and obvious.

2.3. BSE

In October 2000 the publication of the Phillips Report of the BSE Inquiry (HMSO, 2000) brought to an end a chapter in the recently rocked relationship between the British public and the farming industry. The implications of precaution occur at places throughout the report although the longer term outlook, in conjunction with the 2001 Foot and Mouth epidemic may have implications more on the wider subject of the post war practice of intensive farming than on risk and the precautionary principle per se.

At the time of the publication of the report, some 80 victims of the crisis had been identified who had contracted the terminal condition vCJD, now associated with the cattle disease BSE. Bureaucracy, delays and faults in safety systems were highlighted in the BSE crisis however the key factor identified is the process of identifying how to handle hazard. BSE was known in cattle but vCJD unknown in humans. The government, anxious to act in the best interests of public and animal health used conventional scientific advice however the report felt that time, and therefore damage, may have been saved if risk assessments were carried out within government. Although the government did introduce measures to protect human and animal health early on in the crisis, the possibility of risk was not communicated to the public. The government campaign to prevent panic backfired when the human link vCJD was announced in 1996. This severely damaged public trust in government pronouncements of risk.

BSE probably first occurred in cattle in the 1970’s as a genetic mutation but the first identified case was probably in 1985, with MAFF appreciating at this stage that there were human health implications. In 1988 the Southwood Working Party advised that cattle showing BSE should be slaughtered however this report was not explicit in stating that errors in the risk assessment used would have serious human implications. Despite this vagueness, some precautionary measures were put in place to ban cattle feeding with cattle derived meat and bone meal (MBM) products. However, MBM continued to be used for pig and poultry feed which by cross contamination was introduced into the cattle feed chain. The radical step occurred with the announcement of the human link vCJD in 1996 when the use of animal protein in animal feed was banned completely.

The three cases given, of acid deposition, overfishing and BSE demonstrate where the precautionary principle may have been beneficial. Paradoxically, they also demonstrate where precaution in an industrial society is often tied to growth and shareholder interests. The greatest brake on the use precaution is the unwillingness to take risks, above those expected within the bounds of commerce. Industry has never before experienced the risks that total commitment to the precautionary principle would bring. An argument therefore exists for some use of risk assessment as a means of gaining access to the precautionary principle.

2.4. Risk Assessment and the Precautionary Principle

Risk assessment is commonly considered in terms of hazard and potential for exposure to that hazard. The human risk from a magnitude 7 earthquake with the epicentre beneath the Chilean subduction zone is much lower than a tremor of the lesser magnitude 6 at the Californian transform fault system. This is due to the lesser, human, exposure in Chile than the highly populated west coast of California. Assessment of the hazard attempts to quantify the properties of a substance or activity with respect to the potential for human or environmental harm. The process of formal risk assessment methodically attempts to characterise the complete process of a hazard, from source, through development of a pathway, to sensitive receptor.

However, the very nature of identifying and quantifying the hazards, pathways and receptors, will mean exclusion of others, either through judgement or error. Furthermore, those characteristics of the hazard that have been considered, may not have been considered fully and accurately. Analytical data is often incomplete or insufficient for the purpose that it was intended and therefore educated assumptions are required. The hazard due to chemical substances alone is beyond complete quantification for no other reason than the excessive number of possible permutations of situations. A full set of characteristics for singular hazards is itself unlikely to be attained however, this fades into insignificance when one considers that there are currently some 50,000 substances in use in the EU with up to 10% of these having a known detrimental effect on aquatic systems. To this, up to 1000 new chemicals are added per annum (Santillo et al., 1998).

Uncertainties of risk assessment can be compensated for by the use of pessimistic or optimistic assumptions. These compensations do not consider deficiencies in assessing the hazard, complexities of the receptor or those hazards which cannot be assessed because they are unknown. In assuming all the relevant factors of safety, risk assessment is an optimistic approach, but in practice, pessimistic assumptions are sometimes applied. An example of the use of factors of safety was given by Santillo et al (1998) by referring to the Tolerable Daily Intakes (TDIs) of humans to hazardous chemicals. TDIs are extrapolated from animal toxicology tests and an underestimation of hazards may produce lower factors of safety than initially given. This approach based on laboratory experiments is one of management and not precaution. With this in mind, Santillo et al (1998) express the fear that precaution, in the regulatory decision making process, could become ‘hostage to the availability of scientific data’. By making decisions purely on scientific data availability, the erroneous and dangerous assumption may be made that if evidence of an effect is absent, this is the same as absence of an impact.

In closing this discussion on the interaction between risk assessment and the precautionary principle, transparent mechanisms are required to identify system unknowns and subjectivity. Although the sciences do have a role in describing systems, hazards and impacts, they cannot be the sole drivers of policy. In the case of difficulty in predicting when environmental damage becomes irreversible, this is often impossible to predict. In these cases, risk assessment with pessimistic weighting cannot replace precaution, and although risk assessment is a logical prioritising tool, Santillo et al (1998) suggest that the Precautionary Principle remains the central model for responsible predictive action. Furthermore, the use of pessimistic weighting in risk assessment as an alternative to the precautionary principle lose the original intentions of the spirit of precaution.

3. Criticisms of the Precautionary Principle

As should only be expected with the introduction of something so radically different into the conventional world of science, technology and government, the precautionary principle is criticised in various ways. Purists might argue that it is a form of pre-scientific thinking and not suited for modern industrial society, however, this different way of looking at the problem could also be one of precautions advantages. As a perceived political or management philosophy, it may be felt to be not suited as a way of assessing knowledge and uncertainty in part of the regulatory process. This extends further, with many scientists regarding the more recent formulations of the precautionary principle as policy tools that impose additional, non scientific constraints on environmental decision making (Gray & Bewers,1996). It may be considered that there are greater risks from precautionary action than there are from doing nothing. In fact, the decision to delay action by doing nothing, is a decision in itself and therefore must accept the future consequences.

The principle applied specifically to different aspects of the environment can be considered to have similar application elsewhere. The Second International Conference on the North Sea in 1987 produced a Ministerial Declaration containing a short form version of the precautionary principle. This stated that the participating governments agree ‘to accept the principle of safeguarding the marine ecosystem of the North Sea by reducing polluting emissions of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate at source by the use of the best available technology and other appropriate measures. This applies especially where there is reason to assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the living resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even when there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects (the "principle of precautionary action")’. This however is an argument against the precautionary principle, that by seemingly dispensing with the need to establish causality, it becomes unscientific either in part or in whole. A fundamental criticism of this statement is in the definition, that only the direct chemical effect is dealt with, whilst the largest impact on marine biota is the physical disturbance of habitats by reclamation, change in river sediment loads, removal of marine aggregates and, perhaps the greatest, fishing activities as detailed elsewhere in this essay. This applies whenever the precautionary principle is applied, where definitions do not adequately convey the full picture. The precautionary principle in a marine context requires a generic approach accounting for both chemical and physical anthropogenic effects on biota.

Gray & Bewers (1996) have two further criticisms of this text, both concerning the nature of polluting impacts. Firstly, it is not clear how the properties are to be considered, individually or together. Secondly, these terms are not quantified, leaving the vague descriptions to be interpreted outside the Declaration. Furthermore, the use of best available technology (BAT) may produce systemic inefficiencies as the resulting decisions may be overprotective in some cases yet underprotective in others. Inappropriate discharge controls may be based on misunderstood perception of effects, rather than on scientific justification. These errors may also be reduced if the practical application of the Declaration pays appropriate attention to the social and technological aspects that are inherent in each of the different sites under consideration.

It has been suggested that science and technology will suffer if precaution becomes prevalent in policy making. If industry feels threatened by the promise of precaution indicating prevention, then innovation will be prevented, even if just a perception of risk is present to some unspecified people. The introduction of GMOs, for example, can not be allowed under the precautionary principle until proof of no harm has been demonstrated. In addition, scientific debate is prevented, as by removing the burden of proof from the activist and placing it with the scientist, a shift takes place in the language used. The scientist used to speaking a supposed logical and rational language may be become powerless to respond in the same, some would say, unjustified and whimsical language as the environmentalists (SIRC, 2001).

Life is a risk and if precaution in human experience was always exercised, much of what makes up the human world, good as well as bad, would not exist. It is not a developed world hazard that singly kills the most people, but a developing world disease, poverty. Supporters of the precautionary principle may be accused of yearning for an agrarian pre-industrial ideal however they do not offer viable alternatives, such as would reduce starvation. With over 33 million people in Africa infected with AIDS (UNAIDS, 2000) and representing 70% of global cases, it seems unlikely that any solution would not be dependent on modern technology. A technology developed through risk taking.

4. Precautionary Principle and Scientific Knowledge

As it is not have to rely on scientific evidence and is thus unscientific, the precautionary principle should not be part of science. Although this statement is at first glance a strong criticism, in fact it could also be construed to be a wake up call, if one were needed, as a reminder that although not in science, the precautionary principle can fulfill its role be being parallel to science. Whilst not dictating the direction of science, it can be used as a guide, in conjunction with science. Whilst the precautionary principle has been described as unscientific, this label could equally be given to the more often used assimilative approach, where the capacity of the environment to assimilate pollutants is scientifically defined and using these levels, ‘safe’ discharge limits are defined for licensing purposes (Wynne and Mayer 1993).

As has been demonstrated by the acid rain case, and the current issue of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, rather than advance with precaution, many governments prefer to gather more scientific data. Research is often carried out in place of action instead of in support of action. This may be under the belief that more research leads to more understanding and so better definition of risks. This argument is weak as more research can produce more questions than are answered.

The growing awareness of the precautionary principle as a means of environmental policy formation was perhaps aided by the growth in the use by environmentalists of public information. By making widely visible the information of scientific uncertainty that governments would rather hide, a new momentum was created in a public not known for radical action (Wynne and Mayer, 1993). The Greenpeace campaign against dumping of radioactive waste at sea in the 1980’s saw change in policy when the public became more aware of the scientific evidence, in particular the uncertainties in science, previously hidden. The same non governmental organisation (NGO) methods were applied to the proposals of British Nuclear Fuels Limited to construct a deep underground repository for radioactive waste at Sellafield, where the uncertainties and unknowns relating to key properties such as hydrogeology and tectonics were brought into public discourse (Hunt, 1994). Although this kind of action by environmentalists may have been criticised by the governments and the science community under the label of anti-science, if anything it promoted the reflexive action of increased vigour in treating uncertainties in science.

Government and industry may demand more research on the basis that the existing research is not enough proof of harm, as demonstrated by the stance adopted by the UK government and electricity generation industry in response to the acid rain issue. Likewise there is a polarised view on the climate change issue regarding the extent of threat and the degree of urgency of major policy responses. From the environmentalists’ view, the uncertainties in the General Circulation Model and its inferences regarding anthropogenic induced enhanced global warming. On the other hand, industry sponsored science argues that the effects will be less serious and do not warrant policy change.

Conventional science is unable to provide complete questions or answers however far reaching proposals have been suggested for a ‘greener’ science (Wynne and Mayer, 1993). Although this would not elucidate uncertainties, by being more candid about its limitations, a greater public dialogue should be encouraged with respect to anthropogenic impacts on the environment. Greener science with raised public participation in policy formulation would be more amenable to the use of the precautionary principle as a norm. Intrinsic to this new ‘greener’ science paradigm is the use of language more appropriate to non scientists, avoiding the alienation that can be compounded in policy formation.

5. Conclusion

The precautionary principle can play an important role in the protection of the environment. In its purest form, it is unlikely that it will have many takers, even in the most environmentally enlightened European countries such as Germany. Committees legislating environmental issues such as genetically modified organisms and their introduction to mainstream agriculture, are dominated by scientists which gives a perhaps false impression of validity and therefore safety. Greater informed public participation in the decision making process should shift the burden of proof in favour of the environment and the introduction of a general precautionary framework. Whilst the ‘greener’ science of Wynne and Mayer (1993) is not an imminent reality, the principle of language changes in policy committees may be. The plain English campaign of recent years has seen language use in official documents become clearer, this could likewise be the same in public – science interfaces.

Broadly, the principle can be applied to human activities for which there exists a scientific basis for believing that damage to habitats or harmful effects to species are likely to result. Pessimistic assumptions can be used on which to base actions, in order to allow for environmental unknowns. Risk assessment is important as a filtering tool, allowing specific definitions such as persistency, toxicity and ability to bioaccumulate to be distilled into degree of hazard for precautionary judgement. The use of science in parallel to precaution should give the precautionary principle a higher level of credibility.

References

My thanks to Bryan Wynne for pointers towards reference sources.

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Copyright D Haynes
Last revised: March 04, 2002.